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was	the	object’	(Segal,	19917:	43	–	my	emphasis).		As	Alford	suggests,	such	rigid	symbolism	means	that,	‘we	fail	to	learn	all	we	could	about	the	world	because	we	force	it	into	a	framework	determined	by	our	phantasies	and	needs,	giving	the	world	less	of	an	opportunity	to	modify	these	phantasies’	(Alford,	1989:	149).			Applying	the	object-relations	lens	to	norms	produces	two	observations.	First,	norms	as	an	expression	of	an	ideal	represent	a	form	of	rigid	symbolism	–	a	posited	universalism	enables	engagements	with	external	objects	in	a	literal	relation	to	internal	objects	by	subjecting	them	to	an	already	perfect	internal	structure.	Thus	norms	seem	to	order	and	rationalize	the	world,	making	it	appear	more	predictable,	manageable	and	less	frightening.	Through	rigid	symbolization,	the	other	becomes	an	expression	of	the	idealized	self.	Second,	the	power	of	norms,	which	are	social	creations,	is	magnified	because	they	are	joint	enterprises	that	collect	individuals	together	in	a	common	cause.	This	reinforces	the	sense	of	the	universal:	the	organization	can	be	an	expression	of	the	individual	writ-large,	a	super,	more	powerful	individual.	In	identifying	with	such	an	organization,	the	individual	is	affirmed	in	its	sense	of	itself	in	the	world,	and	of	the	wider	certainty	of	its	objects.	The	role	of	IOs	in	pulling	together	an	ideal	sense	of	the	individual	writ-large,	of	projecting	onto	the	world	clear-cut	and	certain	categories,	provides	psychological	underpinning	to	individuals	that	belong	to	or	identify	with	it.4		Relating	this	to	the	identity	and	wellbeing	of	individuals,	the	construction	of	norms’	objects	and	the	constraints	on	organizations	that	promote	them	–	it	could	be	argued	that	defensive	splitting	and	projecting	of	very	idealized	good	and	bad		4	Some psychoanalysts have attempted to extrapolate individual ego-formation onto 
groups – mirroring similar attempts in IR (Wendt, 2004). Bion’s work, for example, 
suggests that the unconscious dynamics in groups can lead to forms of group 
idealization or denial in ways similar to those developed by individuals (1974).  Others 
have explored these ideas in discussions of politics and war (Gallagher, 2011; Segal, 
1997).  	
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onto	external	objects	produces	two	effects.	First,	it	limits	the	subject’s	potential	for	engaging	with	the	complexities	and	ambiguities	of	the	world,	and	therefore	of	realizing	more	complex	internal	objects.	This	has	profound	implications	for	the	IO	that	serves	up	certainty	in	this	way.	Such	a	simplified,	rigid	division	of	the	world	into	idealized	objects	suggests	an	investment	in	an	idealized	image	for	such	an	organization,	and	an	inability	for	it	to	recognize	its	own	ambiguous	wholeness.	Second,	it	forces	external	objects	into	rigid	categories	that	are	over-determined	by	the	subject’s	internal	objects.	Such	misrepresentations	work	to	reinforce	the	power	disparities	found	in	relationships	between	large	powerful	IOs	and	the	countries	they	work	with.	In	the	next	section	I	will	consider	these	effects	through	an	exploration	of	the	World	Bank’s	good	governance	programme	in	sub-Saharan	Africa.			
Good	governance:	chopping	Africa	into	bits		Good	governance	is	an	agenda	of	best	political	practice	designed	to	promote	economic	development.	The	World	Bank	employs	this	norm	in	its	work	with	developing	countries,	using	it	to	define	what	has	gone	wrong	with	the	role	and	work	of	the	state,	and	to	devise	ways	to	make	it	work	better.	The	concept	was	first	developed	in	the	Bank’s	1989	report,	Sub-Saharan	Africa:	from	crisis	to	
sustainable	growth,	as	a	response	to	the	continent’s	particularly	poor	development	record	throughout	the	1980s	(Maldonado,	2010:	4).	Governance	was	presented	as	a	major	shift	in	the	Bank’s	approach	to	development,	one	that	replaced	its	previous	structural	adjustment	paradigm	rooted	in	a	more	simplistic	idea	that	states	are	bad	and	should	be	cut	back,	to	one	which	argued	that	states	are	vital	for	development,	that	some	states	are	good	and	others	are	bad,	and	that	it	is	possible	to	turn	bad	states	into	good	states.			In	this	section	I	do	three	things.	First,	drawing	on	its	own	policy	literature	and	that	of	supporting	organizations,	I	describe	the	World	Bank’s	understanding	of	good	governance.	Second,	I	discuss	some	of	the	critical	literature	on	good	governance	that	highlights	the	ways	in	which	the	Bank	simplifies	the	political	
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context	within	which	it	works.	And	third,	I	bring	object-relations	theory	into	the	discussion	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	such	simplifications	are	predicated	on	three	discursive	and	ideational	splits	which	create	separate	and	idealized	good	and	bad	objects.		Governance	has	become	the	lever	by	which	the	World	Bank	identifies	development	failure	and	prescribes	remedies	for	it.	‘The	clamor	for	greater	government	effectiveness	has	reached	crisis	proportions	in	many	developing	countries	where	the	state	has	failed	to	deliver	even	such	fundamental	public	goods	as	property	rights,	roads,	and	basic	health	and	education’	(World	Bank,	1997:	21).	States	with	low	capacity	need	to	get	the	‘fundamentals’	right,	‘without	which	sustainable,	shared,	poverty-reducing	development	is	impossible’	(Ibid:	23).	The	fundamentals	include:	‘establishing	a	foundation	of	law,	maintaining	a	non-distortionary	policy	environment,	including	macroeconomic	stability,	investing	in	basic	social	services	and	infrastructure,	protecting	the	vulnerable	and	protecting	the	environment’	(Ibid).	The	key	priorities	of	public	policy	reform	that	dominate	the	good	governance	agenda	are	‘reducing	corruption,	strengthening	civil	society,	and	reducing	poverty’	(World	Bank,	2001).		Good	governance	has	been	a	successful	norm	in	terms	of	its	uptake	by	a	wide	range	of	donors,	including	western	states,	multilateral	donors	and	international	non-governmental	organisations	(Abrahamsen,	2000:	48).	Unlike	the	Bank’s	previous	structural	adjustment	policies,	which	remained	contested,	good	governance	has	succeeded	in	normative	terms	by	becoming	the	unquestioned	prescription	to	promote	development	in	poor	countries.	Such	a	shared	agenda	necessarily	expresses	a	sense	of	a	universal	good,	and	the	good	governance	approach	does	this	by	presenting	the	business	of	governance	as	a	neutral,	essentially	technical	exercise	involving	a	set	of	institutions	and	practices	that	can	be	applied	anywhere	in	the	world.	‘A	crucial	part	of	the	justification	of	the	Bank’s	activities	is	that	economic	relations	are	natural,	hence	aiding	their	development	is	not	imposing	its	own	conception	of	the	good	but	rather	assisting	in	what	is	a	natural	course	of	development’	(Williams,	1999:	81).		
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Together,	donors	attempt	to	transfuse	these	principles	into	outlier	states,	bringing	them	into	the	international	fold	through	socialization.	For	example,	Britain’s	Department	for	International	Development	(DfID),	an	enthusiastic	promoter	of	the	good	governance	agenda,	argues	that	good	governance	policies	are	designed	to	bring	about	‘capable’	and	‘accountable’	governance,	and	that	‘this	is	largely	contingent	on	getting	the	right	kind	of	politics’	(DfID,	2009:	5).	And,	as	US	Secretary	of	State,	Hillary	Clinton	argued	on	a	visit	to	Nigeria	that:	‘the	most	immediate	source	of	the	disconnect	between	Nigeria’s	wealth	and	its	poverty	is	a	failure	of	governance	at	the	local,	state,	and	federal	level…	Without	good	governance,	no	amount	of	oil	or	no	amount	of	aid,	no	amount	of	effort	can	guarantee	Nigeria’s	success.	But	with	good	governance,	nothing	can	stop	Nigeria’	(Clinton,	2009).	Africa,	as	one	of	the	most	substantial	targets	of	development	funding	and	policy,	has	been	subjected	to	good	governance	reforms	for	the	best	part	of	two	decades	because,	from	the	perspective	of	donors,	‘institutions	in	Africa	have	not	yet	progressed	sufficiently	to	make	a	significant	contribution	to	development…	[they]	are	not	yet	strong	enough	to	permit	countries	to	continue	pursuing	appropriate	policies’	(Nsouli,	2001).			The	longevity	and	vigour	of	the	good	governance	programme	in	Africa	has	spawned	an	extensive	critical	literature	that	explores	the	effects	of	transplanting	a	supposedly	universal	norm	onto	African	contexts	(Williams	and	Young,	1994;	Williams,	1999;	Weiss,	2000;	Abrahamsen,	2000;	Kelsall,	2002;	Mkandawire,	2002;	Harrison,	2005,	for	example).	In	particular,	this	literature	deals	with	the	ways	in	which	the	World	Bank	and	other	donors	have	tended	to	simplify,	ignore	or	overlook	the	political	complexities	of	African	polities.	Kelsall	discusses	how	reforms,	which	appear	to	‘take	place	in	an	air-conditioned,	administrative	bubble,	isolated	from	the	political	atmosphere’,	potentially	disrupt	deeply	entrenched	interests	and	political	relationships	(2002:	605).	In	African	political	communities	and	wider	societies,	Harrison	argues,	‘individuals	are	not	isolated	and	utilitarian,	but	members	of	ethnically-defined	networks	of	power	and	mutual	support’	(2005:	253)	and	as	such	are	characterized	by	a	‘“rhizomatic”	form	of	power	that	pervades	society’	(Ibid:	252).	The	simplifications	of	the	good	governance	analysis	and	prescription	come	nowhere	close	to	getting	to	grips	
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with	these	complexities.	Instead,	it	has	been	suggested	that	they	better	represent	preoccupations	of	the	donors,	and	in	particular	donors’	desire	to	formulate	a	‘liberal	universalism’;	a	‘liberal	project’	which	seeks	to	remake	Africa	and	Africans	on	supposedly	neutral	liberal	lines	(Williams	and	Young,	1994;	Williams,	1999).			Digging	beneath	the	political	analyses	of	good	governance,	in	a	way	that	seeks	to	complement	rather	than	replace	them,	I	now	turn	to	the	ways	in	which	the	good	governance	agenda	can	be	understood	within	the	context	of	object	relations.	I	argue	that	good	governance	produces	discursive	and	ideational	splits	in	three	distinct	planes:	between	the	donor	and	the	recipient;	between	the	recipient	state	and	society;	and	between	individual	actors	within	the	recipient	state.	In	all	cases,	splitting	results	in	the	creation	of	apparently	wholly	good	and	wholly	bad	objects.			First,	the	good	governance	norm	reifies	a	split	between	a	principal,	the	donor	‘who	wants	“good	policies”’	and	the	agents,	the	recipient	regimes	which	are	‘deemed	to	be	self-serving	and	corrupt’	(Mkandawire,	2002:	15).	This	perception	was	the	basis	of	a	regime	of	conditionalities	whereby	recipient	regimes	were	expected	to	shift	economic	and	political	policy	in	order	to	secure	continuing	aid	(Ibid).	Mkandawire	argues	that	in	a	whole	range	of	donor	approaches	to	Africa’s	governance	problems,	this	differentiation	between	donor	and	recipient	is	constantly	reinforced:	‘In	the	culturalist	view,	African	states…	were	depicted	as	hopelessly	and	incurably	steeped	in	Africa’s	debilitating	culture…	From	an	economics	points	of	view,	African	institutions	were	infested	with	those	who	had	captured	state	policies	to	serve	their	narrow	interests	[while]	a	more	technocratic	view	questioned	the	analytic	capacity	and	the	bureaucratic	acumen	of	the	African	state’	(Ibid).	Whether	it	was	Africa’s	‘debilitating	culture’,	its	self-interested	elites	or	the	weak	analytic	capacity	of	its	bureaucrats,	African	countries	as	the	objects	of	development	reform	are	decayed,	corrupt	and	incapable.		
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In	such	rigid	symbolic	thinking	African	states	and	political	actors	become	straightforwardly	bad,	fitted	into	a	category	that	reinforces	the	subject’s		contrasting	goodness.	In	a	speech	he	made	in	Nigeria	on	good	governance	and	the	ways	in	which	the	World	Bank	was	supporting	transformation	in	Africa,	then	president	Paul	Wolfowitz	related	a	discussion	he	had	had	with	his	daughter	about	how	often	ordinary	Africans	greeted	him	in	public	places.			 My	daughter	said,	well	gee,	Dad,	I	don’t	think	that	there	are	more	than	20	people	in	the	United	States	who	would	recognize	you	as	the	president	of	the	World	Bank.	And	she	said,	it	must	be	because	the	World	Bank	is	so	important	for	Africa.	And	I	said,	yeah,	I	think	you’re	right.	And	I	remember	feeling	a	little	surge	of	pride	that	we	do	great	things	for	the	people	of	Africa.	(Wolfowitz,	2006)		Although	most	World	Bank	officials	would	adopt	a	less	overtly	self-congratulatory	tone,	Wolfowitz’s	story	distills	an	impression	of	‘good	works’	that	oozes	out	of	the	organization.	All	of	this	conveys	the	sense	of	a	very	clean	cut	between	donor	and	recipient,	overlooking	a	long,	and	often	fraught,	history	of	relationships	between	African	and	western	actors.			Second,	the	good	governance	agenda	creates	a	split	between	‘good’	society	and	individuals,	and	‘bad’	government.	This	is	rooted	in	‘an	artificial	dichotomy	…	between	“state”	and	“market”’	(Weiss,	2000:	803)	where	the	market	encompasses	civil	society,	NGOs,	and	forms	of	public	participation	that	can	hold	the	state	in	check.	Civil	society	is	the	primary	focus,	its	organizations	characterized	by	World	Bank	officials	as	‘institutions	that	exert	pressure	and	control	as	“watchdogs”	on	state	institutions	in	the	area	of	governance	and	development’	(Matovu,	2002).	In	this	depiction,	civil	society	carries	all	the	virtues	–	‘participation,	transparency,	accountability,	equity,	effectiveness	and	efficiency,	strategic	vision,	and	good	management’	(Ibid)	–	while	government	carries	all	the	vices	–	‘corruption,	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability,	poorly	designed	decentralization,	inadequate	service	delivery,	and	social	exclusion’	(Parker,	2001).	On	one	side,		‘the	poor,	needy,	and	powerless’;	on	the	other,	‘the	
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rich,	replete	and	dominant’	(Ibid).	Once	again,	this	approach	denies	the	complexity	outlined,	for	example,	in	Bayart’s	discussion	of	Africa’s	‘rhizome	states’	whose	roots	reach	down	into	society	(2009).		As	Abrahamsen	points	out,	this	discourse	‘constructs	a	binary	opposition	between	an	alien	state	intervention,	which	is	associated	with	past	development	failures,	and	an	“indigenous	capitalism”,	which	represents	the	basis	for	future	development	successes’	(2000:	50).	She	argues	that	the	World	Bank,	having	flattened	and	idealized	the	‘innate’	capitalist	instincts	of	ordinary	Africans,	constructs	‘an	essential	unity	of	purpose	…	between	the	development	apparatus	and	the	“ordinary	people”,	in	that	they	all	oppose	the	state	and	seek	to	reduce	it’	(Ibid:	52).	Civil	society’s	virtuous	actors		–	who	are	represented	as	‘undifferentiated	and	harmonious’	with	‘no	classes,	no	races,	no	genders,	[or]	ethnic	groups	of	oppressors’	(Ibid:	56)	–	confront	the	inertia,	corruption	and	vested	interests	of	government.	‘Citizens	demand	quality	services,	while	city	managers	lack	the	resources	and	morale	to	perform’	(Matovu,	2000).	All	the	energy,	initiative,	and	qualities	of	good	governance	are	on	the	side	of	civil	society,	while	government	is,	at	best,	tired	and	cash-strapped,	and	at	worst	‘using	communities	to	achieve	selfish	political	and	economic	gains’	(Ibid).		Third,	the	good	governance	agenda	splits	up	actors	within	states,	identifying	and	supporting	‘champions’	or	‘change	teams’	(Harrison,	2005:	247)	in	their	purported	struggle	with	‘predatory	local	elites’	(Mkandawire,	2002:	18).	DfID	has	been	particularly	attached	to	this	approach	which	has	been	called	‘Drivers	for	Change’	(DfID,	2004)	and	is	now	known	as	‘Political	Economy	Analysis’	(DfID,	2009).	The	approach	aims	to	‘get	beneath	the	formal	structures	to	reveal	the	underlying	interests,	incentives	and	institutions	that	enable	or	frustrate	change’	(Ibid:	1)	and	increasingly	‘is	being	used	to	identify	opportunities	for	leveraging	policy	change	and	supporting	reform’	(Ibid:	5-6).	It	builds	on	a	World	Bank	analysis	that	suggests	that	donors	must	get	past	the	evidence	of	failure,	to	explore	‘the	associated	institutional	set-up	and	governance	arrangements’	and	beneath	these,	the	sources	of	inertia	(Fritz,	Kaiser	and	Levy,	2009).	Political	reform	can	be	‘driven’	by	a	handful	of	enlightened	individuals	often	educated	in	
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the	west	who,	with	donor	support,	can	combat	inertia	and	bad	governance	and	realize	substantial	policy-reform	(Harris,	2013).	DfID,	in	advocating	this	approach,	encourages	its	officials	to	‘drill	down’	to	the	‘drivers	which	constrain	or	support	progressive	change’	(DfID,	2009:	13).		This	approach	fits	into	broader	Bank	analyses	which	advocate	simplified	state	structures,	in	which	political	and	complex	bureaucratic	mechanisms	are	cut	up	into	discrete	units.	Within	state	institutions,	incentives	are	used	to	get	individuals	to	do	the	right	thing;	and	between	state	and	society,	transparency	and	freedom	of	information	enables	citizens	to	check	and	monitor	individual	representatives	and	officials.	A	further	favourite	theme	is	that	of	decentralization,	explored	in	a	2002	Development	Report:	‘Building	Institutions	for	Markets’	that	argued	that	decentralized	institutions	could	‘limit	the	state’s	capacity	for	arbitrary	action’	(World	Bank,	2002:	2).	In	this	document,	the	theme	of	corruption	‘a	tax	which	distorts	the	choice	between	activities	and	lowers	the	returns	to	public	and	private	investments’	(Ibid:	9)	is	addressed.	We	are	told	that	complex	regulation	and	closed	trade,	alongside	centralized	government,	weak	electoral	frameworks	and	a	lack	of	information	all	feed	corruption.	Here	is	the	strong	sense	that	complexity,	ambiguity,	and	the	sense	of	opacity	together	erode	governance.	The	World	Bank	instead	advocates	a	pared	down,	simplified	and	unambiguous	state	structure.		Such	simplifications	and	flattenings	make	the	programme	of	development	appear	more	straightforward,	but	they	cannot	in	fact	make	it	more	achievable.	Harris,	for	example,	notes	that	in	the	case	of	Sierra	Leone	which	has	had	intense	involvement	from	DfID,	there	is	little	evidence	that	individual	drivers	for	change	working	in	government	ministries	are	doing	much	more	than	exhausting	themselves	(Harris,	2013).	A	more	open	and	flexible	attempt	to	see	what	African	societies	are	like	would	reveal	a	more	complex	picture	in	which	state-society	relations	are	thickly	interwoven	(Mbembe,	2001;	Chabal	and	Daloz,	1999).	And	yet	the	Bank	and	other	donors	persist	in	their	characterizations	of	individual	Africans	as	virtuous	entrepreneurs	or	victims	who	are	‘just	like	us’	(Gallagher,	2011).	
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	The	Bank’s	approach	does	particular	violence	to	relationships	which	are	constantly	deconstructed	and	simplified.	Historical,	social	and	political	complexity	appear	to	lend	too	much	muddiness	to	the	straightforward	way	it	wants	to	see	the	world;	and	so,	the	Bank	chops	the	world	up	into	bits	through	the	norm	of	good	governance.	I	have	argued	that	this	is	possible	because	the	norm	is	constructed	as	ideal,	so	disallowing	room	for	uncertainty	and	ambiguity.	The	way	in	which	this	norm	is	viewed	as	both	good	and	self-evident	or	‘natural’	allows	only	one	way	to	structure	the	world.	This	is	an	example	of	rigid	symbolism,	one	in	which	the	Bank	creates	stark	and	idealized	objects	that	reflect	a	sense	of	the	Bank	itself	and	its	relationships	as	ideal.	
	
	
Conclusion		What	does	all	this	splitting	achieve?	A	running	theme	in	World	Bank	discussions	of	governance	is	the	problem	of	fragmented	donor	interventions	(World	Bank,	2008:	14).	It	recognizes	that	when	donors	contribute	large	amounts	of	aid	in	uncoordinated	ways,	this	can	create	more	messiness	and	retard	development.	The	Bank	argues	for	country-ownership	(an	abiding	theme	of	all	donors	in	recent	years)	but,	alongside	it,	a	single	global	agenda.	There	is	a	sense	that	aid	recipients	are	many	and	diverse,	but	the	‘international	community’	should	be	integrated,	somehow	able	to	gather	global	challenges	together.		I	have	argued	that	the	norm	of	good	governance	can	be	viewed,	not	as	a	smooth	diffusion	of	ideas	and	practices,	but	as	a	project	of	splitting	the	world	up	into	good	and	bad	bits	that	reify	and	repair	a	sense	of	the	good	self.		First,	it	brings	like-minded	western	donors	together	around	an	apparently	incontrovertible	principle	and	good	project.	Good	governance’s	technocratic	qualities	represent	a	transcendence	of	messy	politics	and	the	pursuit	of	a	disinterested	ambition	to	‘repair’	broken	states	and	economies.	Together	these	characteristics	create	the	sense	of	an	‘ideal’	international	community.	But	second,	this	ideal	community	is	built	on	the	back	of	a	split	up	world,	one	that	is	split,	first,	between	donors	and	
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recipients;	and	one	that,	second,	splits	recipient	governments	and	societies	into	good,	or	‘progressive’	actors,	and	bad	or	‘corrupt’	actors,	and	denies	local	political	or	social	meaning.	
		Norms,	I	suggest,	can	perform	a	particular	and	important	function	as	idealizations:	they	enable	subjects	to	construct	the	idea	of	a	more	certain,	morally	clear-cut	world	out	there	in	a	way	that	avoids	internal	discomfort.	What	is	the	cost	of	this,	the	practical	implications?	I	suggest	they	are	two-fold.	First,	in	terms	of	the	subject,	as	Segal	suggests,	projective	identification,	can	‘strip	the	ego	of	its	potential’	(Segal,	2006:	95).	In	this	case,	we	can	wonder	about	the	effects	of	idealization	on	the	IOs	that	have	been	set	up	to	explore	the	world	and	find	solutions	to	its	problems.	Such	a	rigid	engagement	compels	them	to	inflexibility	and	immaturity;	such	avoidance	of	‘psychic	discomfort’	dooms	them	to	continually	misunderstand	and	misrepresent	the	world.	Second,	African	‘objects’,	both	‘good’	and	‘bad’	–	are	clearly	compromised	by	a	relationship	that	currently	rests	on	purposes	that	serve	wholly	different	needs	and	interests	than	their	own.			The	challenge	then	would	be	to	explore	ways	in	which	IOs	might	be	brought	to	accept	internal	ambiguity,	a	more	messy	and	compromised	history	and	relationship	with	external	objects,	and	ultimately,	a	more	integrated	and	uncomfortable	role.	Such	a	project	would	be	of	importance	to	both	the	organizations	themselves,	and	to	their	objects	–	in	this	case	of	good	governance,	African	countries,	states	and	populations.	However,	object	relations	applied	here	suggests	that	the	social	construction	of	the	norm	of	good	governance	acts	as	a	defensive	mechanism	against	internal	ambivalence.	The	Bank’s	actors	and	spokespeople,	in	breaking	up	and	defining	African	countries	in	the	ways	described,	are	engaged	in	processes	of	projective	identification	that	enable	them	to	view	themselves,	their	organization,	its	project,	and	the	wider	‘international	community’,	in	idealized	ways.	This	is	an	idea	of	the	World	Bank,	or	the	donor	community,	or	the	international	community,	as	a	good	object,	and	it	has	buy-in	from	far	beyond	its	employees.			
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What	is	being	defended	against?	Bhabha’s	answer	relates	to	the	inherent	ambivalence	at	the	heart	of	liberalism	itself	–	liberalism,	he	argues,	presents	an	idealized	representation	of	a	universal	pure	project,	to	paper	over	the	internal	confusion	and	a	hidden	terror	of	the	colonial	project.	In	this	particular	case,	we	might	point	to	the	ambiguities	and	problems	at	the	heart	of	the	World	Bank	project	itself,	particularly	to	policy	failures	like	its	structural	adjustment	programmes.	The	ideal	of	the	Bank	as	an	apolitical,	benign	actor	pursuing	a	rational,	incontestable	normative	project	suffered	a	severe	shock	in	the	now	widely	recognized	failure	of	the	programmes.	But	perhaps	more	fundamental	is	the	idea	of	the	subject	as	inherently	troubled	by	ambiguity,	something	that	is	writ-large	in	groups	and	organizations	that	carry	and	multiply	anxieties.	Collectively,	Western	subjects	have	tried	to	overcome	this	by	searching	for	a	universalizing	project,	an	idealized	form	of	government	over	an	idealized	population.	This	final	point	underlines	a	gloomy	prognosis.	Bhabha	argues	that	there	is	no	‘passage	from	trauma	to	transcendence…	[because]	both	colonizer	and	colonized	are	in	a	process	of	misrecognition	where	each	point	of	identification	is	always	partial	and	double	repetition	of	the	otherness	of	the	self	–	democrat	and	despot,	individual	and	servant,	native	and	child’	(1994:	138-9).	There	is	scant	possibility	that	the	World	Bank	can	‘grow	up’	or	begin	to	recognize	its	ambivalence:	there	is	simply	too	much	at	stake.	
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